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H – 671

International Court of Justice

H0671-0002

From: Orders of the Fuehrer's Deputy (2639-PS, 2787-PS)

(Anordnungen des Stellvertreters des Fuehrers)

Pages 187, 188

Circular No.181/35

Subject: Association of party members with Jews.

As it has been reported to me, the orders about the association of party members with Jews often get an absolutely erroneous interpretation. In several cases, party members have been called to account because they sold goods to Jews. Thus in one case, official party action was instigated against a party member because he sold an automobile to a Jew. In another case it was caused by a similar behaviour of party members, that the sale of food to Jews was prohibited.

However in no case shall the sale of goods to Jews - as I report specifically by order - be prohibited. In the same manner business people must not be forced, as it has happened, to post the STUERMER in their stores. Contradictory orders are to be rescinded at once.

Munich, 22 August 1935

The Chief of Staff of the Fuehrer's Deputy

(signed): M. BORMANN.

H0671-0003

From: Orders of the Fuehrer's Deputy (2339 - PS; 2787 - PS)
(Anordungen des Stellvertreters des Fuehrers).

Pages 209, 210

ORDER NO. 225/35

1. Enclosed, I forward to you the decree in reference to the dissolution of the Department for Cultural Peace, which the Fuehrer issued on my proposal.

2. The reports, inquiries and other letters, sent to the Department, in the future are to be sent to me to Munich, the Brown House (compare order of 25 Oct 1934). Insofar as orders in competent questions are necessary, they will be issued through me in the future.

3. The attitude, to be taken by the party, its organizations and all leaders is clear; all leaders of the party, of its organizations and affiliated associations must desist from any interference in church and religious questions, all individual actions are prohibited. Reports about excesses of indulging in politics and similar cases are to be reported to me.

4. My order of 13 Oct 1933 applies unequivocally for the party:

"No National Socialist may be put to any disadvantage because he does not profess to be of a certain faith or confession, or because he does not belong to any confession at all. Faith is everyone's own affair for which he only has to answer his conscience. No moral constraint may be exercised."

Munich, 14 November 1935.

Signed: RUDOLF HESS

H0671-0004

From: Orders of the Fuehrer's Deputy (2639-PS; 2787-PS)
(Anordnungen des Stellvertreters des Fuehrers)

Pages 235, 236

I

ORDER NO. 2/36

To the Commissioners of the Party Leadership:

Subject: Ecclesiastical questions.

The Fuehrer's Deputy has ordered again on 14 November 1935 that all party offices must refrain absolutely from taking action in religious and/or ecclesiastical questions.

. . . . . .

.....It is also forbidden to all subordinate leaders of the Party, its formations and affiliated organizations to interfere in the religious and/or ecclesiastical struggles of our time in any way.

In the future those who do not observe the above order of the Fuehrer's Deputy will be prosecuted for behaviour contrary to the good of the Party.

MUNICH, 7 January 1936

The Chief of Staff of the Fuehrer's Deputy.

signed: M. BORMANN

From: Orders of the Fuehrer's Deputy (2639-PS; 2787-PS) K-14

(Anordnungen des Stellvertreters des Fuehrers)

Page 397

Circular No. 74/36

Subject: Austrian Organization.

I already have repeatedly prohibited any interference of party agencies in the interior conditions of other countries by the eventual entering into relations with organizations which follow a National Socialist ideology or one similar to National Socialism.

Above that, all sympathy demonstrations for such organizations of other nations must also absolutely be prevented - even if they are of a harmless character.

Entirely disregarding the fact that thus the maintenance of good foreign political relations of the Reich could be made more difficult, such organizations, which are in contrast to the prevailing dominating form of government, could be agitated by such sympathy demonstrations to an increased resistance against the measures of the government of their country.

This however would force the consequence that valuable elements of German people would be exposed to senseless persecution.

Munich, 3 June 1936

signed: RUDOLF HESS.

H0671-0005

H0671 - 0006

From: Marine Relations Gazette 1937 / Page 465
(Marine Verordnungsblatt 1937)

613. Singing of the song "Victoriously shall we defeat France"
(Siegreich woll'n wir Frankreich Schlagen.)

The Fuehrer's Deputy issued the following decree (under File No. 51/37):

"The discipline of a nation as an expression of its inner strength and unity becomes evident in no small degree in its relation to other nations. Today chivalry and honor are for us National Socialists politically a matter of course. On the other hand, experience shows that nothing is being pursued with cooler reasoning, colder reckoning than foreign-political problems. Well-meant emotional expressions, whether in speeches, in conversations or in telegrams have - if they did not meet the standard set above - always caused almost irreparable damage.

As a happy result of relentless enlightenment in foreign countries as well, recognition of the fact that the nations themselves do not want war, is steadily increasing. They have hardly recovered from the previous one. But a small minority of an irresponsible World-revolution points to, and attempts to incite the nations against each other, to make them each other's enemies forever.

National Socialist Germany has nothing in common with this international inciting of nations. The German nation wants to live, and be respected by the rest of the World. Only a violation of this self-evident right of an honesty-loving nation could be the reason for becoming enemies. Thus our fight is not directed against the Slavic people oppressed and ruled by the Bolshevists

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but against the world revolution pursued by the Komintern. Germany is not an enemy of the Slavs, but the pitiless and irreconcilable enemy of the Jew and of Communism that he brought into the world.

Therefore we must desist from saying anything that would give the impression that Germany is the enemy of any one nation. And under that goes the singing of "Victoriously shall we defeat France" (Siegreich woll'n wir Frankreich schlagen) that in the past has been changed to Russia by Party organization.

We must avoid everything which could disturb the peace efforts of the Fuehrer.

Signed: RUDOLF HESS

The above decree by the Fuehrer's Deputy is promulgated herewith. (B. No. 396, M Wehr. II b, of 15 October 1937.

H0671 - 0008

Copy of Document D 614
Office of US. Chief of Counsel

(Paper Seal of the British Foreign Office)

Hess flew to Great Britain in a Me. 110, from which he landed by parachute in the evening of 10th May, 1941, at Eaglesham in Scotland. He was wearing the uniform of a captain in the German Air Force. He gave his name as Alfred Horn and stated to the Home Guard and the police that he was on a "special mission" to see the Duke of Hamilton, and that he had intended to land at Dungavel, 12 miles distant from the spot where he landed. The prisoner was taken to Maryhill Barracks, and amongst his possessions were found photographs of himself and of a small boy, also the visiting cards of Dr. Karl Haushofer and Dr. Albrecht Haushofer, his son. No other documents or identifications were found on the prisoner.

On Sunday, 11th May, at 10 a.m., Wing-Commander the Duke of Hamilton arrived at Maryhill Barracks and visited the prisoner with the interrogating officer and the military officer on guard. At the prisoner's request the latter two officers withdrew. He then stated to the wing-commander that the latter had lunched in his house in Berlin at the time of the Olympic Games in 1936 and added: " I am Rudolf Hess." The wing-commander had no recollection of the prisoner and was not aware that he had ever seen or met Rudolf Hess. The prisoner then proceeded:

"I am on a mission of humanity. The Fuehrer does not want to defeat England and wants to stop fighting."

His friend Haushofer, he stated, had told him that the wing-commander was an Englishman who would understand his point of view. He had tried to arrange a meeting in Lisbon. He had three times before tried to fly to Dungavel, the first time being in December, 1940, but had been turned back by weather or various other reasons. He did not want to come during the time of British successes in Libya

H0671-0009

lest it should appear that it was the weakness of Germany which prompted the flight, but that now Germany had had some success there he was glad to come. He stressed that his presence showed his sincerity and the German willingness for peace. His main theme was that Hitler was convinced that Germany would win sooner or later; that he (the prisoner) wanted to stop the unnecessary slaughter. He asked the wing-commander to get together the leading members of his party to talk over things with a view to making peace proposals. He then stated that he could tell him what the Fuhrer's peace terms would be. The wing-commander pointed out that there was now only one party in Great Britain. The wing-commander immediately flew to London and reported this conversation, stating that, though he could not be sure, he believed the prisoner was, in fact, Rudolf Hess.

Mr. Kirkpatrick, of the Foreign Office, who had during the period of his official duties in Berlin before the war become acquainted with Hess, was at once flown up to Scotland to identify the prisoner. He had three interviews, on the 13th, 14th and 15th May. At the first of these he confirmed that the prisoner was Rudolf Hess. During these interviews Hess further elaborated the object of his visit. He stressed the enormous power of Germany in the air and in U-boats, which latter, he stated, would grow much greater. He affirmed the certainty of England's defeat by blockade, if not very quickly, in the course of two or three years. He expressed his horror at the prospect of the prolongation of the struggle. He had come, he said, without the knowledge of the Fuhrer to convince responsible persons that, since England could not win, the wisest course was to make peace at once. He gave his word of honour that the Fuhrer had never entertained any designs against the British Empire, nor had he ever aspired to world domination.

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The Fuhrer would sincerely regret the collapse of the British Empire. Hitler had declared to him as recently as 3rd May that he had no oppressive demands to make on England.

The solution which Hess put forward was as follows:

(i) That Germany should be given a free hand in Europe;

(ii) That England should have a free hand in the British Empire, except that the ex-German Colonies should be returned to Germany;

(iii) That Russia should be included in Asia, but that Germany had certain demands to make of Russia which would have to be satisfied either by negotiation or as the result of war. There was, however, no truth in the rumours that the Fuhrer contemplated an early attack on Russia.

(iv) That the British should evacuate Iraq.

(v) The peace agreement would have to contain a provision for the reciprocal indemnification of British and German Nationals, whose property had been expropriated as the result of war.

(vi) The proposal could only be considered on the understanding that it was negotiated by Germany with an English Government other than the present British Government. Mr. Churchill, who had planned the war since 1936, and his colleagues, who had lent themselves to his war policy, were not persons with whom the Fuhrer would negotiate.

Hess concluded by emphasising that the Fuhrer really wanted a permanent understanding with Great Britain on a basis which preserved the British Empire intact. His own flight was intended

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to give Great Britain a chance of opening conversations without loss of prestige. If this chance were to be rejected, it would be the Fuhrer's duty to destroy Great Britain utterly and to keep the country after the war in a state of permanent subjection. These so-called "terms" were restated by Hess in a signed document dated 10th June. The only new point made in this document was the provision that a simultaneous armistice and peace must be concluded with Italy.

It was, throughout, made clear to Hess that there was no question whatever of any talks or negotiations of any kind taking place with Hitler or his Government. Hess has been dealt with as a prisoner of war since his arrival in this country and will so continue to be treated till the end of the war.

14-15

Most secret
9.8.41
1430 hrs to 1730 hrs.

Dr.Guthrie: Our plan, I think, is very good; here we are and we have a short-hand writer there and Herr MAASS (the witness) there and Dr.MACKENZIE there and, as interpreter, Captain RAINES. Herr Reichsminister, I was informed that you had come here feeling charged with a mission and that you wished to speak of it to some-one who would be able to receive it with Government authority. You know I am "Dr.GUTHRIE" and therefore I come with the authority of the Government and I shall be very willing to listen and discuss with you as far as seems good anything you would wish to state for the information of the Government.

[illegible]

J:t: I am very grateful that "Dr.GUTHRIE" has come.

[illegible]

J:t: I know that my arrival - has not been properly understood by anyone.

[illegible]

J:t: Because it is such an extraordinary step I have taken that I cannot expect it.

[illegible]

J:t: Therefore I would like to commence by explaining how I arrived at this.

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J: The idea came to me when I was with the Fuehrer during the French campaign in June of last year.

Dr.G: I would like to know if he would prefer to say "I came to this decision" repeating his words again. It is better in the end because you sometimes get a confusion.

Int: Yes, I see.

Dr.G: Would you mind repeating the last sentence, I have not quite got it. Mr. Shorthandwriter, would you repeat?

Sec: I arrived at the decision to come here after seeing the Fuehrer during the French campaign in June.

J: I must state that I came to the Fuehrer, convinced as we all were that we would conquer England, sooner or later, but in the end certainly. And I expressed the opinion to the Fuehrer that we must/naturally demand from England the restitution of goods such as the value of the merchant fleet, etc. which had been taken from us once by the Versailles Treaty.

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J: The Fuehrer then contradicted me immediately.

He was of the opinion that the war could possibly lead finally to an agreement with England, which he has attempted since he is politically active.

I can testify, that since I have known the Fuehrer, since 1921, the Fuehrer has always spoken about it, the agreement between Germany and England has to be achieved. As soon as he is in power he will do that.

And he told me at that time in France that, even if victorious, one should not impose any severe conditions on a country with which it was desired to came to an agreement.

At that time I had the thought that if in England one knew of this fact, it might be possible that England on its part was ready for an agreement.

H0671 - 0015

J: Then came the Fuehrer's offer to England at the conclusion of the French campaign.

The offer was, as is known, refused.

And this confirmed all the more my resolution that under these circumstances I must go through with my plan.

(Long pause).

Closely following that came the air war between Germany and England.

Which on the whole definitely caused heavier damage to England than to Germany

I had then the impression that England could not give way without losing considerable prestige.

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J: That's why I said to myself, now I must realize my plan all the more, for if I were over in England, England could be enabled to cultivate negotiations between Germany and England without loss of prestige.

Dr. Mackenzie: What he really said was "Anlass nehmen"-(accept as a basis) his arrival here would be a peg, a ground for starting negotiations without a loss of prestige.

Int: Yes, sir.

J: I was of the opinion that apart from the question of terms for an agreement, there was still in England a certain distrust of a general nature to be overcome.

J: Naturally, I must confess that I faced a very critical decision, the most critical in my life.

J: I believe it became possible for me through the [illegible] only on the German side but also on the English side that I continually pictured an endless row of children's coffins with the mothers crying behind them.

J: And vice-versa, the coffins of mothers with the children behind them.

H0671 – 0017

J: I now want to mention certain points which, I believe, play a certain part here from the psychological point of view.

J: I must ascertain something. After the defeat in the Great War the Versailles Treaty was imposed on Germany.

J: And no serious historian is now of the opinion that Germany was responsible for the World War.

J: Lloyd George has said the peoples stumbled into the war.

J: I recently read an English historian – FARRAR – who wrote about EDWARD VII on his policy at that time.

J: This historian FARRAR lays the guilt for the war on the politics of EDWARD VII.

J: Germany had this treaty imposed on her after her collapse, which was not only a frightful calamity for Germany but also for the whole world.

J: All attempts of politicians, of statesmen in Germany, before the Fuehrer came to power, - that is to say, when Germany was a democracy of purest water - to obtain any sort of relief were unavailing. The Fuehrer began by trying to negotiate for alleviation of terms and for the granting of the most primitive rights.

Int: As first or for the first?

J: Perhaps still as first. (Note by J: Must be an error in hearing. Didn't say that.H.H.)

First of all, he demanded a "200,000 man" army for Germany. Refused! A few aeroplanes, a few tanks, a few heavy guns- refused! He suggested that at least gas warfare should be abolished through international convention, and the bombardment of civilians should also be abolished.

Refused! He then suggested that bombers on the whole should be abolished by international agreement.

After this experience the Fuehrer had no alternative but to decide to rely upon his own strength to make progress.

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J: He began by trying to clarify his relation with neighbouring powers.

J: The relationship to Italy was already a matter of history.

J: He signed a treaty with Poland.

J: He allowed France to keep Alsace-Lorraine for ever and promised security of frontiers - (Provided an agreement was reached).

J: He continued to make offers to England in some form or other.

J: The only offer that was accepted by England was the Naval Treaty.

J: That this treaty was cancelled again subsequently resulted from the fact that England in spite of this treaty, visibly was always trying to work against Germany and stand on the opponents side.

Dr. Guthrie: The cancellation of what agreement?

Int: The Naval Agreement.

H0671 – 0020

J: Under these conditions the Fuehrer could not assume responsibility for indefinitely imposing a handicap on Germany with regard to England.

J: Then came the "Anschluss" with Austria.

J: A democratic principle was realised on this occasion because 95 % of the population afterwards voted in favor of it.

Note: It is only on account of the interference of democracies that the realisation of this principle had been prevented in Austria up to that moment.)

J: Then came the Czech crisis.

J: The French minister Pierre Cot had announced that the territory of Czechoslovakia had to serve as an air base in a future war of France and England against Germany.

J: Then came the illtreatment of German compatriots in Czechoslovakia which gave us a chance to step in .

J: Then came Munich.

J: The Fuehrer said to me after this, how lucky he was; he believed that that was the beginning of an understanding with England.

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Dr. Guthrie: Will you forgive me for one moment, there is just a point I did not quite follow. Herr Reichsminister was saying "the illtreatment of Germans" meaning, I suppose, inside Czechoslovakia - Sudeten Germans - which gave somebody the excuse .....

Secretary: It was not really ' the excuse ', (Handhabung is the German word). He means the reason, the sound reason, for intervening.

Dr. G: The grounds.

J: Wherewith I must emphasise that these maltreatments were not invented - I can speak as a witness.

J: After Munich the Fuehrer said how happy he was that now a possible means of understanding had been arrived at.

J: Unfortunatelyv messages then arrived from England to the effect that Chamberlain had stated that he was only trying to gain time to arm.

Int: The Times certified this statement once more at the death of Chamberlain.

J: In addition to this the historical line of England's policy always is that she builds up a coalition against the strongest Continental power and sooner or later attacks it.

H0671 – 0022

J: You probably know here that General Wood stated in U.S.A. under oath in 1941 before the Foreign Relations Commitee, that:

Mr. Churchill had stated to him in 1936: Germany was getting too strong; she must be destroyed.

Dr.G: What is the Foreign Relations Commitees?

Int: The United States Foreign Relations .....

J: In addition, the fact became known that the remaining part of Czechoslovakia was as before being financed by England and France for purposes of further rearmament.

The Fuehrer therefore, as a responsible statesman, was forced, to get rid of this great threat in the middle of Germany.

Poland: The Corridor was created by the Versailles Treaty.

England should imagine what it would be like to have a corridor going right through the middle of England - for instance for Ireland to reach the North Sea.

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J: In spite of this the Fuehrer was ready to solve this question by negotiation and already on the 5th and 6th January, 1939, he made the necessary suggestions himself and through his Minister for Foreign Affairs to Beck.

J: It was suggested to return the entire German town of Danzig to us.

J: And secondly: Poland should retain the Corridor. Germany merely wanted to have two extraterritorial lines trough the corridor a railway and a motor-road.

J: The Fuehrer wanted to guarantee the borders.

J: The German people were horrified at this suggestion.

J: Only the Fuehrer with his authority was able to make it at all.

J: In the middle of 1939 the suggestion was again made to Lipski, the Polish Ambassador.

J: Poland was, of course, ready to accede to this suggestion.

J: It was only prevented from doing so by British influence.

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J: Poland was even prepared to accede to the German requests very shortly before the start of the war - in the last eight days.

J: Then the mutual assistance pact was signed with Great Britain with the result that Poland was no longer ready to accede to anything.

J: Poles, including members of the Polish Foreign Office, have since confirmed this.

J: The maltreatment of German nationals again furnished the pretext for intervention.

Dr.G. The grounds for intervention?

Intr: Yes.

J: Neutral journalists have been there and have confirmed these atrocities.

J: I could show you among other photographs, photographs of German children who died with their thongues nailed to a table.

J: Then came the war.

J: Then followed the declaration of war by England and France. After the Polish campaign, the Fuehrer made his first peace offer to England and France.

In the period which followed the Fuehrer received authentic information about England's plans in Norway.

J: It was then also confirmed the plans extended to the occupying of certain parts of Norway as bases against Germany.

J: It is significant that our troops, when the Fuehrer drew the consequences and moved into Norway, were received then as if they were the Englishmen who had been expected.

J: Up there, there also was a nephew of Prime Minister Churchill who had expressed himself that the English were coming now.

J: He told the population there that Englishmen were coming now.

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H0671-0026

Int: The Cossack-Altmark affair and the laying of mines in Norwegian territorial waters preceded our march into Norway.

J: These two incidents were the first territorial contraventions of international law in this war.

J: Apart from flights of allied airplanes and bombing.

J: In the autumn and winter news was also received of corresponding plans for Denmark.

J: It was proposed presumably to establish several air bases and perhaps a naval base in order to close the Skagerrak.

J: The plans of the Entente for Belgium and Holland then became known to us.

J: An attack through Belgium and Holland was intended against the Ruhr Territory as soon as sufficient war material had been accumulated behind the Maginot line.

H0671 – 0027

J: It became known to us that maps, which indeed we found later, had been printed already for this purpose.

J: There were English and French billeting parties in these countries already.

J: Instructions were offered for refueling Entente vehicles in these territories.

J: This was all confirmed by the finding of files at La Charite.

J: I have especially mentioned all this in detail because I know that this, from a psychological point of view plays a great role against us here.

J: With regard to the "Transgression of international law and with regard to the breaking of treaties" etc.

J: I believe, as far as I am familiar with English history, that in the same situation, England would have acted in the same way even had she not had our motives.

J: I need only bring Copenhagen to mind the expression 'to copenhage' does not originate in Germany but in England.

H0671 - 0028

J: I could relate in the course of history a whole list of England's breaking of treaties and international laws.

J: I only have to bring to mind Lawrence of Arabia.

J: It is well known that he resigned his rank of colonel because he could not approve that England did not keep her word to the Arabs.

J: The reproach of the oppression of small nations comes ill from England's mouth.

J: We do not oppress small nations. Apart from the fact that they had to disarm, the Czechs feel themselves proportionately quite well.

J: It is certain that Germany has not treated any nation as England the Boers, the Indians, and the Irish.

J: With us, there's no Amritsar episode.

J: We have not created any concentration camps for women and children, as was the case with the Boers.

H0671 - 0029

J: And the German people have not forgotten that the Armistice was concluded on the basis of Wilson's fourteen points and not adhered to.

The armistice was broken at least in one particular respect, that of the interning of the German fleet.

It is also well known that the Versailles Treaty was also broken in one of the most important points, that of disarmament.

According to the Versailles Treaty, the other countries should have to disarm also after a certain time, as Germany disarmed herself.

The comparison has been made to me, that England did in fact disarm its land army, its air force, etc.

Disregarding the fact that this was no disarmament like that of Germany, the essential power for England is her Navy.

H0671-0030

J: And if the thirteen capital ships, first class ships, which England retained had been taken as the basis for the German army - the army is the most important thing for Germany - then we should have had a very powerful army with all the modern weapons.

What the fleet is to England, the army is to Germany in her position.

And I believe, if we converse openly as man to man, then we should mutually - I have only mentioned this, because these recriminations are being made against us - we should eliminate these recriminations.

And I'm of the conviction myself that leading Englishmen who know the situation exactly do not even inwardly make these recriminations.

But these recriminations do play a considerable role in the minds of our peoples.

And the mistrust, which the German people has against the British is certainly not more limited than the mistrust vice-versa.

H0671 – 0031

J: The question is continually put to the German people: What guarantees has Germany that England will hold to her future treaties in a better way than previously in her history.

In addition there is considerable bitterness in Germany because the German people know, that the Fuehrer for his part did not want the bombing war - i.e., the bombing war on the civilian population.

The Fuehrer made the suggestion at the beginning of the war that such bombing attacks should be abstained from.
(long pause)

Despite this, ever-increasing attacks by the British Air Force on the German civilian population of Germany took place.

From the English side comes the counter: Rotterdam.

But I may point out that Rotterdam . . . lies within the so-called "Fortress Holland".

And this heavy attack had as a result that on account of it, much, much further bloodshed in Holland was prevented.

Since as the result, Holland then capitulated.

H0671 - 0032

J: The English attacks, on the other hand, have not the advantage that they would somewhat prevent a further heavy shedding of blood through the weight of their attacks.

J: Despite the attacks on the German civilian population, the Fuehrer hesitated and hesitated again and again to order counter-attacks.

J: But gradually mothers who had lost their children, families who had lost their relatives came and reproached the Fuehrer, why he did not finally retaliate.

J: The victims were practically always in towns and places which had absolutely not the slightest military importance.

J: When the Fuehrer had to come to the conclusion that common sense would not prevail in England, despite his hesitation and despite his warning -

J: - then he acted just according to the rule of conduct of Admiral Lord Fisher.

H0671 - 0033

J: 'Moderation in war is folly if you strike, strike hard and wherever you can.

J: But I can confirm that it was indeed always difficult for the Fuehrer to give the orders for these attacks.

J: It pained him deeply. I was a witness of this.

J: He was constantly in full sympathy with the English people who were the victims of this method of waging war.

J: I should like now to go into the situation as we see it in Germany.

Dr. Guth-rie: May I just interrupt here to say, with the permission of Herr Reichs-minister, because I listened closely to his account of the German view of the war since it began, and, naturally, I will read all he has said again; I have not interrupted, I wish to be a good listener.

J: Yes.

Dr.G: - which is the compliment which I wish to pay him and that is why I have come. He will, of course, understand that I could not accept this account of the war and I hope he will plainly understand that, if I do not contradict or challenge what he says about it, it is not because I agree, but because we must in this matter agree to differ; and because the real purpose why I have come is to hear from him about his mission.

H0671 – 0034

J: That does not need to be translated. I understood. I assumed that from before. I overlooked emphasizing that at the beginning, since I do not look at "not contradiction" as acceptance.

(must naturally hold good the other way around also in the course of our conversation, i.e., referring back to what Dr.G. says)

Dr.G: But I want to be quite clear to him, you see. I think I have made my words clear. I do that partly because I wish to be courteous, but I do it also because I wish to come to what is the real point that is coming now. That's all right as long as we understand each other.

J: I assumed also from before that naturally a contradiction could or would be raised about many points.

D.G: Yes, of course. That is really a matter that will ultimately be decided perhaps by history, perhaps not in very few years.

J: Certainly. I have also said all that, only so that Dr.GUTHRIE get a picture like us, how the German people look at the situation just the same, whether that now is right or not in every point, according to his opinion.

D.G: Yes, I quite understand that. And, no doubt, Herr Reichsminister will understand also that in developing his mission.

H0671-0035

he must remember that the British people too are a proud people - "Herrenvolk" - and will not easily accept such reproaches, were it not that we are talking here together in a friendly way, and I wish to hear what are the progpsals he has come to make here. I think that is why he has come.

J: My flight was -the decision about this flight- strongly influenced by the fact, that the leaders of Germany are absolutely convinced that England's position is hopeless.

J: It goes so far that we ask ourselves again and again:what is England still hoping for, that she is still continuing this war?

J: A ll our aircraft factories are still standing.

J: A very large number of factories have been added since the beginning of the war and others still are being completed.

J: Our production is such that last winter we had difficulties in storing the finished airplanes completely.

J: Since the fighting front did not require them, the losses were comparatively small, that was the production of a very short period perhaps one day.

H0671-0036

J: At that time we accumulated aircraft because first we wanted to have the new personnel really fully combat trained.

J: You can believe us, that we personally undertook the training of new personnel on just as large a scale as the manufacture of aircraft.

J: The flying personnel which is now coming along is moving about on approximately the large scale as the entire English Expeditionary Force to France.

(Note: There is a mistake which may have been mine or that of the stenographer. "Air personnel", not "flying personnel", was intended. Air personnel includes ground staffs. A.A. personnel, etc. It is, of course, clear that there are not hundreds of thousands of flying personnel trained or in training. The discussion which followed was based on a misunderstanding.)

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J: Above and beyond that, new waves of training naturally extend farther, again and again.

Dr.G.: I don't understand that; he is speaking of a comparison of two totals;

he says that his flying personnel that is now coming along -

Int: (To J.) That is now trained already, or is still in training?

J: That is now trained, but the new wave, that is engaged in training, this again also has -

Int.: Is it included, or is it not included?

J.: No, the new, that which has been finished, already partly finished in the last months, is now being finished and/or has been finished.

Int.: He means the flying personnel that is at present fully trained.

D.G.: The total, he means?

Int. : Yes.

J.: I mean, that which is finished now, but above and beyond that, it is natural, that we have currently corresponding strength in personnel, which is not yet ready.

D.G. I mean, whatever the proposition is, it's so simple, I mean creating two totals; I don't understand what the two totals are.

Int.: The two totals are that he has the completely trained forces at present at their disposal.

Dr.G.: Air forces?

Int.: Air forces.

Dr.G.: Equal to?

Int. : Equal to the B.E.F. in France.

Dr.G.: Does he mean the tanks and the -?

Dr.G.: The total number of men.

Macken-
zie:

H0671 - 0038

Dr.G.: And what is the total number?

J: I said, they are approximately on about the same scale as the British Expeditionary Corps.

Dr.G.: Probably Herr Reichsminister knows what is the total number he is assessing?

Int: What is the number which you-?

J: The number of flying personnel (1) revolves around the hundreds of thousands, I wanted to say, that which is finished with troining and that which we will receive, they are such waves, it is not all completed at the same time.

Dr.G.: That isn't clear to me. Herr Hess is stating that the number of air personnel now ready to serve in Germany are equal to something; well, he must have a figure in his head then. It is simpler to state the figure than to go half way round the world divided by six. What is the figure?

J: I cannot at all state the number exactly, cannot state it out of military reasons, I only say, that it revolves around a correspondingly large scale, that them in the course of the war, wave-like training has been carried out, but which does not revolve around the tens of thousands, but around the hundreds of thousands.

J: It is well known here also that Goering personally exists on a very large scale.

Dr.G.: He's a very large man! (Laughter).

J: New types of aircraft are added to this.

(1) See note on p.25.

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Int: It's clear that the level of training of our soldiers is an unusually high one.

J: I receive letters continuously from flying personnel who complain grievously that they're being kept behind the lines, although they have been trained, so long already.

J: I know that England had also received and is receiving new machines, new material, and new personnel.

J: But we are quite certain we shall maintain our lead.

J: Both with regard to material -

J: to personnel -

J: But especially in considertion of our geographical strategical position.

J: There is a great difference if one has to make the hop over here from France from Holland or if one has to go from here over the North Sea to Germany.

J: There is a difference especially in the bomb load which can be carried.

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J: There is also a difference in the use made of the weather situation.

Above all, in autumn and winter it is naturally much more difficult to fly such a long distance and/or to strike weather in which these flights can be undertaken with safety; like the shorter way from France.

In view of my personal relations with the flying world - Messerschmitt is a friend of mine, and I know all the aircraft factories; I know the air chiefs - I have some idea of what will happen to England sooner or later.

And there I can only say - I might emphasize that here - without being guilty of exaggeration I can state quite definitely it will be terrible.

What has happened so far in the war in the air in England in comparison to that which is to come, was really only a small prelude.

And that is one of the reasons - that I might emphasize - why I have come here.

H0671-0041

J: And this is something inconceivably horrible, an air war of this sort in the form which the air war will take.

J: I consider it my duty so to speak, as a human being to warn you in time and to submit the proposal, which I have brought.

J: That which on the one hand can be directed against us by England, is in no comparison to this.

J: It is clear, that we have made advantageous use of the entire time since the beginning of war to safeguard the civilian population on the largest scale. Above all by construction of shelters and reinforcing the cellars.

J: And what we were able to accomplish in this field within a definite period of time- we had really plenty of time at our disposal- that, of course, we have proven with the Westwall.

Dr.G. Would you mind repeating the last sentence again?

J: And what we were able to accomplish in this field within a definite period of time- we had really plenty of time at our disposal- that, of course, we have proven with the Westwall.

J: Anevacuation in its entire organizational completeness, of which we Germans are capable, is further prepared in all the cities, which may actually perhaps receive heavy air attacks.

H0671 - 0042

J: Such things function with us in Germany. You press a button and it functions.

[illegible]

J: Up till now it has been entirely unnecessary; we have not even thought of doing so.

J: Die Verluste, die wir erlitten haben, sind im Vergleich zu dem, was England erleiden musste, ganz gering.

[illegible]

Dr. Guthrie: May I just interrupt you there Herr Hess, I find a certain difficulty in following this. You told me earlier, you know, that Herr Hitler was most averse to making any attack on towns in this country, but you said that, though that was his policy and he is the undisputed ruler and leader of Germany, that great bitterness had been expressed in Germany by the civilian population. I do not understand how the civilian population can with great bitterness complain of being heavily attacked from the air unless the truth be that they had suffered terribly; and it appears to me to be quite inconsistent to say at one moment that there has been great bitterness in Germany on the part of the civilian population because of the attacks from the air of British bombers, and then you say a little later on that nothing at all has happened which has upset Germany in the least and that all the plans are quite perfect and that all that happens is that everybody takes shelter. To me those two things are not the same.

H0671-0043

J: I did not say that nothing had occurred, but I did say, that the losses are very small in comparison to that which England had to suffer.

D.G: The right view then is apparently that there has been heavy loss in Germany from British bombing attacks. That must be then the result.

J: I did not say heavy losses. I said very much smaller, indeed not to compare with what England had suffer.

D.G: Forgive me interrupting, but I did not see how the two things agreed.

Dr.M: Even so, as we have only lost 30,000 civilians and they 're very much lighter, they must be negligible, and if they 're negligible, how about the bitterness?

Dr.G: But your information is - and therefore you stated here, and I, of course, listened with respect to what you say; one can measure other things by your statements - and your information is that the German population has not seriously suffered to any great extent by British bombing.

J: They have suffered.

J: If a town is bombed there will be casualties, of course.

H0671-0044

But this stand is no comparison to England's losses. I am grateful to Dr. GUTHRIE for his questions.

Dr.G:It wasn't intended to interrupt you, but if two things don't seem to agree I like to know how it stands. Another question, do you mind? You see, you have been describing to me how everything in Germany is ready: vast quantities of aeroplanes and pilots and, no doubt, of other material too, which, if it was used, would finish off the war by attacking England. I am rather inclined therefore to ask you, well then, why do you go on losing men in Crete and Iraq and in other fields of war when you have in your hand something which is going to defeat us straight away? Why does the great German strategy prefer that?

Dr.M:If Germany has, as you say, such a striking force in her hands, which can settle England with one blow, why, with this weapon at hand, does Germany need to run around in the Balkans, in Crete, etc., if she has this wonderful blow-striking weapon in hand, in order to strike us dead?

J: I did not say at first, that she had it at hand, but I did say, that it will come.

Dr.M:You said that trained people, flying personnel, already exist in quantity - and airplanes - in the mass of our expeditionary corps, i.e., in hundreds of thousands. And Dr. GUTHRIE says if this colossal weapon already exists in Germany's hands, why is there this running hither and thither in the Balkans, with certain bloodshed, which is entirely unnecessary, if England can be struck dead this summer?

Dr.G:Which is what you intended to do last autumn.

Dr.G:Your view is, you see, that in the last autumn we suffered much more than you.

H0671 - 0045

Dr. G: Surely, what a curious thing then that the invasion stopped!

J: May I come back to this once more? I didn't say, that it is in our hands already, but I did say, it will come now, that is to say these formations are in the process of being organized and sooner or later the moment will come where the air warfare will assume forms and proportions that are horrible. I did not say further that this would be decisive in the war.

Dr. G: If I may say so, Herr Hess, I can quite understand that argument if you put it like that; I think I do understand what it is which you are placing before me for the information of the British Government. Your view is - your message, if you like - is that you believe there will be in the future a far more violent and terrific, overwhelming attack on this country -

J: Yes.

Dr. G: - than there has yet been and you say that the thought of this is one which makes you unhappy because it involves terrible loss of life of innocent people, women and children, in both countries. And, as I understand you, you say that the mission with which you charged yourself is largely inspired by that fact. I understand that. We don't argue about what will happen if we did all this today, but you really are making a statement for the British Government to consider in view of what you believe will be future developments, isn't that so?

H0671-0046

J: Yes.

Dr.G: That, I think, is the sore point. Well, it I might suggest it, because it necessarily occupies some time, would you feel it convenient, would it suit you to tell me for the British Government what is the proposal you suggest should be put forward or considered.

J: Would you please translate this, only the last sentence?

Dr.G: May I suggest that you present you proposals to us in order to prevent that.

J: Ha, I would like to do that, if I could only that one point, the submarine warfare -

Dr.G: Please continue as you planned. I am quite content and very willing to listen. That is, after all, what I have come for.
Yes, I would be grateful if you would.

J: I only want to say one thing to the point, which Dr.WACKENZIE just mentioned, that enough airplanes are available and personnel, already trained are available in large numbers. But that does not that one has formations; already for the front because of that, Would you say that please?

Dr.G: Am, I know.

J: For airfields would have to be created for these formations.
The crews must fly for familiarization with these machines in formation.
One needs suitable weather for that. One can only do that partly during winter.

H0671 – 0047

J: I wanted to mention, this only so that clarity is achieved.

Dr. G: I quite understand. What you are putting to me is the formidable evidence which in your view, will her after, in the future constitute an overwhelming force. It is the elements –

Int (to J) : There are the parts of this threat, which – we understand that –

J: Yes.

Int (to J) : – for something which will happen at any time.

Dr. G: Future?

J: Future yes. When however these formations have flown for familiarization, that is from the manpower and material view point –

Dr. G: Now about theeU-boat –

J: I may say one more thing that – only as comparison – the losses of our population during the entire war are considerably lower until now than the losses which we incur in a year by traffic accidents.

Dr. G: Yes. In Germany do the soldiers drive the motor cars very fast?

J: (laughs).

Dr. G: They do in this country.

J: Also, yes.

Dr. G: They make a lot of accidents.

J: From time to time, the Fuehrer gets furious when he sees that and has a few of them locked up again. However since our automobile traffic has been severely reduced in order to save gasoline, the total losses by

H0671 - 0048

traffic accidents and bombs together are probably not much higher than the traffic accidents alone before.

Dr. G: I dare say that's a very good way.

J: In Germany as in England the civilian morale is highest where the bombing attacks have been made. There the people are hardened.

J: In the last World War at the front, it was demonstrated that the toughness of the Germans is certainly no less than that of the English.

J: And the collapse in the world war began at home, not through enemy action but through persons at home who were the allies of the Entente.

J: And this internal enemy behind the lines has been completely liquidated.

J: On the other hand, the Fuehrer is loved as never before by the German people.

H0671-0049

Int: That's clear.

If England - and I should not like to wish that for you - would get into the same position as we were in 1918 -

- and also later -

and a man came along who would put E. back on her feet, who would give England the strength as the Fuehrer did in Germany, England would likewise love him.

And the German people know what would happen to them if they capitulated. English and French politicians have made this quite clear in speeches since the beginning of war.

I do not know who said it, but someone went so far as to say that the time would come when the German people would have to beg at the field-kitchens of the Allies troops.

And it can be believed that we have used these facts and continue to use them for propaganda purposes amongst the German people.

H0671 - 0050

J : Besides the enemy at home, the collapse was also caused by famine.

J : There is no question of that happening in this war.

J : Rationing was introduced from the very beginning.

J : And our performances in these matters have been recognised everywhere.

J : In some respects we have been able to increase our rations We were so careful to allow less in the beginning in order to be able to increase it at a later date.

J : Raw materials are absolutely assured.

J : Do you agree to that, Sir. Then I do not want to go into explanations.

J : I can also add a few words to that.

D.G.: I didn't mean to....

Int.: Would you like to ask him to expand the point, if you agree that...

D.G.: I don't think we can conduct the conversation on the basis that I agree to everything that Herr Hess says unless we expand it or argue about it. I am waiting - I say it with great respect - I am waiting to be informed of the matter for which I was invited to come down here.

J: Yes.

H0671-0051

Dr.G.: : And now I have been waiting, I suppose, for two hours - I don't know how the time goes - I came down here in order that Herr Hess might have the opportunity for which he asked of explaining to a representative of the British Government his mission, and I haven't heard a word about it yet, so that, while there are many things we can talk about, I should be sorry to have any controversy on anything except the object if of his mission.

J. Yes. I should like to reply that I assumed that one could first arrive at a decision on a suggestion if one can get a view of the situation as it is regarded in Germany.

Dr.G: I understand. In order that I may see what you have to say about your mission in its proper framework, it is necessary to have a sketch of what lies behind. I quite understand and I am making no complaint but I am being silent - patient.

J: (laughing) I briefly want to mention shipping space U-boat warfare.

Dr.G: Yes, that is what I recollect we were going to have after the air ...

J: That is the point. In Germany we are convinced that that is the decisive point for England.

J: The numbers of our U-boats, I can assure you, are very considerable, especially with regard to those which are at present under construction and are being delivered.

H0671-0052

J: I should like to correct myself as follows: the number of the U-boats will be extraordinarily large when present construction and constant deliveries are added. I mean that the number is not extraordinarily large at present but it will be soon.

J: [illegible] U-boat [illegible].

J: The strength of the Fuehrer lies in his long distance planning

J: And with regard to the airplanes, but above all with regard to the U-boats, he has done preliminary work on a very large scale - as the decisive weapons against England.

J: And he had also decided to safeguard the construction of U-boats against bombing attacks after he foresaw that England' air attacks would be directed against our industrial centers.

J: The same applies to U-boat bases.

J: But an extreme decentralisation of manufacture is the best protection for our U-boat construction.

H0671-0053

J: I would like to say that three quarters of Europe is participating in submarine construction; there are factories which build submarine parts without knowing that they are submarine parts.

We have the possibility of using our big rivers in this respect for the construction of submarines -

that our assembly -

Dr.G: Does he mean for the construction of U-boats or does he mean the bringing of the U-boats down from the places where they are?

Int: He hasn't finished his sentence, Sir.

J: ...by the fact that we can transfer our assembly plants of there parts very far inland.

Dr.G: - bring them down the rivers.

J: Down the rivers, yes. For a river, which carries a thousand ton barge, can also take 750 ton submarine - that goes as far as into Czechoslovakia.

Dr.G: Might I just ask, Herr Minister, if it is convenient, a question about that? We in this country are under the impression that we have bombed very heavily and successfully the U-boat yards, say at Kiel, and U-boat construction is going on there.

Int: I believe that you are not quite in the picture about the real effect of such attacks.

H0671-0054

J : For by an aerial one cannot judge something like that implicitly

J: And as for reports by agents, we have our own experiences to judge from.

Dr.G: Yes, I merely told Herr Hess, I am not an expert on that, but I read the papers carefully, the confidential papers, you see, and I would have said that we had delivered very heavy attacks and very successful attacks on the shipyards where U-boats were being built in Kiel, and, I think, in Bremen and, I think, in Hannover; I don't feel sure about Wilhelmshaven, I don't know whether you do build U-boats as near as Wilhelmshaven.

J:Yes, but as I said, these are not all our shipyards for building submarines

J: I have just related how far we are able to make use of our rivers and/or are actually using them.

J: Partly using them, partly are in the process of expanding them.

J: However, what newspaper reports mean...

Dr.G.: I may tell you that U-boat crews - sailors, German U-boat sailors who have been made prisoner, have, as I am informed complained bitterly that the U-boat production which they were assured would take place, - the additional U-boats - had not been forthcoming. They may be wrong, of course,

H0671-0055

they may be telling a prisoner's (laughing) tale, but that is what I am told they say. Is that not right ?

Dr.M :I think that is quite right.

Dr.G :I am very much interested in what you say and, of course I quite appreciate it when you say that Germany has a vast production, as well as great powers of organisation because the Germans are a wonderful people about those things. I quite understand that. But what I have great difficulty in understanding is the suggestion that we have not done a great deal of damage to your U-boat shipyards. But we undoubtedly think we have.

J: And as regards newspaper reports -

Dr.M: He says "for example"

J: I can give you an instance. I was in Munich on 9th November 1940, when a British air attack was made on the city.

J: English papers reported subsequently that very heavy destruction had been caused, above all on the railways of Munich.

J: On the railway sidings - tracks.

H0671-0056

J: I am witness that not one single bomb fell on any railway. Secondly one house was destroyed and a few houses were damaged by bombs, but certainly not more than four; there were also a few roofs set on fire. The English official report published startling stories about the terrific effect of the bombs on Munich.

J: Not one bomb.

Int: Not one bomb hit any railway tracks.

Dr.G: Well, Mr. Hess, in the last war, in the latter part of it, I was a ground officer in the British Air Force, and I was especially concerned with night bombing and I had reports every morning early at dawn. And constantly we received reports that our bombers had smashed up the Lille Triangle and we sent machines over to photograph the next day and the railway line was never broken at all.

J: Yes, I only state this example because Mr. Guthrie said before that he had arrived at the opinion, that the U-boat bases in Kiel had suffered heavy damage, from the newspapers.

Dr. H: Not from the newspapers, no, no. "Papers" means reports, especially photographs and from prisoners.

J: Yes, yes.

Dr.G: And I should have supposed that the German plan of building U-boats in parts at various places away back in the interior and bringing them together to - 'zusammen' - or whatever it is .....

J: Collecting point.

Dr.G: I should have thought that was due to the fact that it was not safe to continue to construct along the borders of the sea.

J: May I ask for a translation - only the latter part.

Int: That this plan was devided because

J: No, no. May I point out that his plan was developed by the Fuehrer at a time when

Dr. M: He said that the Fuehrer planned this long before any attack took place, in other words, the Fuehrer foresaw that we were going to make attacks.

Dr. G: It's my fault, I have interrupted you. It is my fault entirely. You were just saying that, in the view of the authorities in Germany, this U-boat warfare will get more intense and was really the decisive point.

Int: A little time ago the Fuehrer announced the beginning of the real U-boat war.

Int: I can assure you that the U-boat warfare as envisaged by the Fuehrer has not yet commenced.

Int: I would like to say a few words about the strategical situation as compared to 1917.

Int: In 1917 we had already small base, the so-called Heligoland Bight.

Int: And to the west of it

Int: We also had a few small bases on the Belgian coast.

H0671-0057

H0671-0058

J: That was all we had and even that was so heavily mined that we suffered terrific losses in sailing through it.

J: We now have a base which extends from the upper point of Norway to tl of west France to Spain.

J: A blockade is impossible. In those days we could not pass through th Channel after a short while.

J: We are now on the other side of the Channel.

J: The convoy system has failed in comparison with 1917/18; that is certain.

J: In addition, compared with the last war our U-boat warfare is supplemented by attacks from the air.

J: We can be pleased when we say that our new constructions are showing results now.

J: In addition, which was not possible before, we are now able to destro ship[illegible] by air attacks in harbours and shipyards.

J: We destroy the shipyards themselves.

H0671-0059

J: We destroy the inland dumps.

J: Above that destroy the factories for home production.

J: It should not be forgotten that Lloyd George and I believe Jellicoe too and others have admitted that England was very nearly on the brink of a catastrophe in 1917 by reason of sub-marine warfare.

J: Despite the fact that then the position was for Germany a much more unfavourable one than it is now.

J: As far as new inventions are conserned which have been announced by England from time to time, they have at least until now had no success.

J: Although inventions have been announced to us since the outbreak of war.

J: We are therefore convinced that we shall force the decision in the field of battle.

H0671-0060

J: That our figures regarding the loss of tonnage are the correst ones, has been confirmed to us by American experts.

J: And it is absolutely impossible —

Dr.G: When Herr Hess says "Our Figures", does he mean the figures which have been published from time to time in the German broadcasts.?

J: Our monthly official report.

Dr.M: The official returme. Does Herr Hess say that they have sunk practically the whole of our merchant fleet ?

Dr.G: At that rate, you see, what has happened is that you have sunk the whole of the British Merchant Navy, you have sunk it all.

J: Maybe but added to it was tonnage from Denmark, from Norway, tonnage from Greece. A large amount of tonnage has been added, one May not forget that.

Dr.G: You see, it wouldn't be worth while having a discussion. I said it merely as a matter of interest, that's all, I mean in a friendly way. Nothing amuses the British people so much as the German figures about sinking British tonnage.

J: Yes?.

Dr.G: It makes them laugh.

J: Maybe, but I fear, that the day will come when the English people will no longer laugh about it.

Dr.G: I don't attach very much importance to that really.

J: I fear that the day will come, I am convinced that the day will come.

Dr.G: The day may come, theyday may come! But the statement was that the German offical figures show that they were correct. If they are correct, you know, it's a pity we are not all dea

H0671-0061

Dr.M: Otherwise the nation would have starved already.

J: No, I believe Dr. GUTHRIE is not properly informed. The number, which was now admitted in a total by Germany, by far does not correspond with the total tonnage the English had at the beginning of war.

Dr.M: The total tonnage was 15 million tons.

J: 15 million?

Dr.M: Yes. And the Germans claim to have sunk 12 million tons.

J: Yes.

Dr.M: Also 7 million tons that have been damaged to such an extent, that they are no longer serviceable, they are not included. So we practically have no ships left.

J: Yes.

Dr.M: Which would mean for our island absolutely no tonnage anymore, for the middle Eastern Expeditionary corps and other war operations.

J: But I have also .....

Dr.G: I beg your pardon. There is only one thing I can suggest - don't let us dispute it, it was merely an interjection. I quite understand the thing that matters in your argument. You are telling me that the authorities in Germany are convinced that they will be able to have greatly increased U-boats quite a statement one can understand. I won't discuss it.

J: Yes.

Dr.G: But believe me, we are not quite so hard up just yet - not just yet !

J: Yes, but then I would like to say something, in the event an error might arise. I may again emphasize that England has received the tonnage from Denmark, Norway, from Greece - that was a very large tonnage - Holland, Belgium.

H0671-0062

J : All the tonnage, which was available has been added to the English tonnage. Is that also written down, yes?

Dr.M: But we know what we have lost.

Dr.G: Well, I don't want us to quarrel about it. I want to get to your mission.

J: I only want to say yet, that we are also convinced, that America cannot create a change.

J: American ship production cannot be sufficient to cover these losses.

Int.: We have an exact picture about the quality and quantity of airplanes which could be produced within a given time

J : The idea which may have sprung up here - it has been discussed repeatedly to surrender the British motherland eventually at one time and to continue the war from the Empire is hopeless - rather the idea would lead in effect to a catastrophe for the motherland.

Int.: Germany would not consider excluding the heart of the British Empire from the struggle because the United Kingdom had capitulated.

H0671-0063

J: If on account of lack of tonnage one would reach the point when England hat to capitulate ----

J: England once created concentration camps in the Boer War and, according to the monument there, I believe, 26,000 women and children were left to perish, accordingly we would not nesitate, if the British Empire does not want to give up the war to exercise in the some manner a pressure on the mother country.

Dr.M. . The meaning is exactly: We could not hesiate to starve out the British Isles in that event.

J: In addition we would not consider occupying the mother country in this case because we would have to feed the people then.

J: Assuming it had not already been occupied.

J: In the event of a capitulation without occupation, we should only occupy a number of important air bases.in the most extreme case.

Int.: And we would shut them off from the population- the starving population so that our own soldiers could never see anything of it.

H0671-0064

J: That is a very hard point of view.

J: England has the possibility of making a finish under the most favourable conditions.

[illegible],J: I don't know whether Dr. Guthrie is already aware of the conditions of making peace. But I assume he will wish to have them in official form.

Dr.G: I will reply. I think we are now coming to the real reason for our interview. I quite understand what you have already been saying, but we now come to the point. If I might suggest it, Herr Reichsminister, I would ask you briefly to tell me what is the mission which you have undertaken, You can say it, I have no doubt, clearly and briefly; I think that is the most important thing for me to know.

J: The conditions under which Germany would be prepared to come to an understanding with England. I have heard from the Fuehrer in the course of a great number of conversations.

J: I must emphasize that these conditions have always remained the same ever since the outbreak of war.

J: In view of my self-chosen mission ...

H0671-0065

J: When I was considering the Question of this flight, I always made enquiries of the Fuehrer as to the conditions of peace.

J: So that I could be absolutely certain that nothing had been altered in the meantime.

J: I should like to add - I should have said it at the beginning - that I had deferred my plan from the beginning of January until a short time before my flight.

J: I did not undertake the flight then because England then had the successes in North Africa and the Greeks against the Italians. The situation was not favorable for England's compliance.

Dr.G: May I just ask you through the Captain ? One of the first things you said in our conversation this afternoon was - I think the very first thing you said - was that you arrived at your decision to come here after seeing the Fuehrer at the time of the French campaign. That was what you said?

J: Yes.

Dr.G: Well, you see, that was long before the 1st January last, That's what you said. You said - it was almost the first thing you said: "I arrived at the decision to come here after seeing the Fuehrer at the time of the French campaign." And then you said you were confirmed by that campaign in your resolution that you must go through with your plan, that means to come here. I had thought, therefore, you see, that

H0671-0066

the time - the date - when you first made the plan and intended to came was not in January last; it was before that.

J: Yes. That is quite clear. I conceived the plan in June already and I tried to excente it on 10 January. For a number of reasons, weather conditions, etc, and difficultis in obtaining an airplane, could not excente the plan amy earlier.

Dr.G. But I gather it is right to say that he arrived at his decision to came here after seeing the Fuehrer at the time of the French campaign.

J: Yes, after January, I only postponed the flight.

Dr.G: I think I had better, if you will allow me, ask you one or two questions. May I? Because, of course, it's bound to be asked. Could you tell me - would you tell me; do you came here with the Fuehrer's knowledge or without his knowledge?

J: Without his knowledge. Absolutely.(Laughs.)

Dr.G: Well, I mean, one wants to know. You made the plan, you see, to come again and again and you have on each occasion before entering on this mission, or planing to came on this mission, on each occasion you have always inquired from him of his views on the conditions of peace.

J: Yes.

Dr.G: But I have it from you quite clearly - and indeed I so understood - that in fact you came without any knowledge of his or any authority.

J: Yes, surely.

Dr. G: So that suggests two questions perhaps. One question: Why do you come now? You thought of it again and again, why come now. That is one question.

J: Yes.

Dr. G: You see, it's a little difficult to understand and I think that the Government will naturally want to know because they would say: Why has he come now? Well, what is the reason?

J: May I develop quite shortly now this came about? When I resolved on the pl In June, I did not really have the possibility to fly for a long time, I had to prepare all that first.

Dr. M: Perhaps it would be best if the Reich Minister would relate all this, then I will - then I'll translate the whole story to you.

Dr. H: Yes, Well, may I ask him a question? Why does he come now?

J: Good, I did not have then the opportunity for a long time to fly really. I first tried to get an airplane through General Udet. He refused that because he knows that the Fuehrer does not want that fly - such machines. I then turned to Messerschmitt. At Messerschmitt, they then put a machine at my disposal. That does not mean by a long shot that I really could fly the machine, I first must familiarize myself with it. For that, I again do not have muc time with my other acivity so that took up much time. Furthermore, I had to be very careful with Messerschmitt - they were not to know what I intended to do. Thus I could only gradually convince th to build in spare gas tanks for me and new instruments.

Dr. M: May was actually the first moment in which the plan.....

H0671-0067

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J: No, not yet. Then I waited the whole time - it would have been possible from December on, practically. Then I waited the whole time for suitable weather, it was winter, the danger of icing-up. The flight from Augsburg, where I had to take off, to Scotland, is a very long one. Either there was bad weather over the area of Southern Germany or there was bad weather over Scotland, so that it was not favorable, so that I had to postpone it again and again - I received the weather reports everyday and I did not get away because I, as a single pilot did not have the same chance as an airplane with a normal crew.

Dr.M: Really the delay took place owing to a whole series of difficulties First of all he tried to get a machine from General Udet; he wouldn't give it him because he knew the Fuehrer wouldn't permit him to fly. Then he got into touch with ...

Dr.G.: That is true, is it? He had forbidden you to fly?

J: (Laughs)

Dr.M: Oh Yes, in 1934. I remember the case because ...

J: Forbidden to fly a single engine ship, but this was a two engine ship.

Dr.M: When he had been turned down by Udet, he got in touch with Messerschmidt, a friend of his, and various things had to be done, he could not fly the machine at once, several things had to be prepared, extra tanks put on, then he had to do a bit of training and he did not have much time, you see. That took some time and then by December it was the first time everything was ready. After December there were all sorts of weather difficulties, he had to have really ideal weather conditions to start his flight to Scotland; he was alone with his two-seater machine, and so on. So, what with

H0671-0069

the postponement because of WAVELL's victories. May really was ...

J: On 10 January, I made the first attempt.

Dr.M: On the 10 January he made one attempt and so on.

Dr.G: It wasn't then really world events, external events: he just missed his opportunity.

Dr.M: But he did abandon the project for the moment in view of WAVELL's victory.

Dr.G: I know. Well, that was one of the questions, you see. You must not mind if I put the other, because you will see it is a sensible question. You have said, Herr HESS, that you do not come with the Fuehrer's authority or sanction or knowledge. Well then, you are going to tell me about these conditions of peace, you have not done so yet, but is the view which you are going to put before me held by other people? Are there other important people in Germany who share the view you want me to listen to?

J: May I ask to translate this for me?

Int: Are there other people in Germany who share such a view - other leading people?

Dr.M: But this is not even the whole affair. Here is an important question. You must excuse me if I ask it; for you will still see that it is important. One can hardly think that you came here without the Fuehrer's permission, right? Is that which you will tell Dr.GUTHRIE, your own private idea or is this idea shared by other leading people in Germany.

J: The ideas are the ideas of the Fuehrer. And they are decisive, one and alone.

Dr.M: And you do not know of the ideas of other personalities?

H0671-0070

J: They, of course, agree with the fuehrer from the beginning, that is absolutely a matter of course. When the fuehrer tells them: "These are my ideas" then they say: "Yes".

Dr.M: Yes, but are the other personages informed ?

J: That I don't even know, whether the individuals are informed and whether the fuehrer has also talked to them, I do not know.

Dr.M: You cannot state for certain whether these ideas agreed with the ideas of the leading personages. You can only state that if these ideas were those of the fuehrer they would have been approved by the others. But whether they agreed with the ideas of the leading personages you do not know.

J: That I do not know but it is immaterial.

Dr.M: These ideas are the ideas of the Fuehrer; he has been able to establish in long conversations with him. The ideas that would be accepted by the leading personalities in Germany, because it is their habit to accept everything that the Fuehrer says or does. Whether these personalities know what's in the Fuehrer's mind about peace comditions, he does not know. Whether these ideas are shared by the leading personalities, he does not know. All he knows is that they are the ideas of the Fuehrers and that is good enough to be accepted by leading personalities.

Dr.G: I see.

J: But I can, I told you the other day and emphasized it to the Duke of Hamilton, I have very rarely given my word of honor in my life because I consider it too sacred a matter, in this case I give you my word of honor, that this which I have written down here is what the Fuehrer told me in several conversations.

Dr.G: Do you think that the Fuehrer also told other people about this thing?.

H0671-0071

J: I consider that probable that he talked with GOERING for example about it. I do not know, but I consider it even to be certain

Dr.M: It's probable, but he cannot affirm it. He thinks that he probably has discussed it with Goering, but he can't say for certain.

J: But that does not mean anything with us. Only the Fuehrer matters.

Dr.G: We have reached the moment to know what are these conditions

J: May I ask you, to say in addition - my word of honour

Dr.M: He usually does not give his word of honour because it is an important matter, but in this case he is prepared to give his word of honour that everything that is written down on that paper represents the view as expressed to him by the Fuehrer on several occasions.

Dr.G: So, those are the conditions. Well, now, I am greatly obliged to you. Would it be convenient to you if we were to hand them to Dr.Mackenzie.

J: Yes, what date is today?

Dr.G: Today is the 10th (sic)

Dr.M: The 10th June (sic)

J: Do you want to translate ?

Dr.G: I think you may just read them out. They are not very long and I am sure that Herr Reichsminister has taken a lot of care to write them down carefully.

Dr.M: "Basis for an Understanding."

"1. In order to prevent future wars between England and Germany spheres of interest shall be defined. Germany's sphere of interest is Europe; England's sphere of interest is her Empire."

Dr.G: Europe there, of course, means Continental Europe ?

J: Continental Europe, yes.

Dr.G: Does it include any portion of Russia ?

H0671-0072

Dr.M: He said,"that European Russia interests us is self evident,if we, for example conclude a treaty with Russia then England may not intervene in any way."

Dr.G: I only wanted to know what was the meaning of 'European sphere of interest' you see? If Germany's sphere of interest is in Europe, one naturally wants to know whether Russia, European Russia, Russia which is not in Asia, Russia which is on the west of the Urals -

J: Asiatic Russia does not interest us.

Dr.G: Moscow and all that part, one wants to know, is that part of the European Zone?

J: No, not at all.

(Note by J: I cannot have said it. Hour, yes, in contradiction to p. 61 above. Or I had misunderstood the question).

Dr.G: Italy?

J: At any rate this is my conviction and the Fuehrer surely has no other.(That is to say that Asiatic Russia is not included.) I must emphasize, that the Fuehrer had not expressed himself whether the remainder of Russia is included, but I consider it as out of the question in advance, doesn't interest us in the least over there.

Int: Does Italy also belong to it?

J: Italy? Of course ! Italy is a part of Europe and if we conclude a treaty with Italy, then also in this case England may not interfere in any way.

Dr.G: We had better go on.

Dr.M: " 2. Return of German Colonies."

H0671-0073

3.

"2. Indemnification of German nationals who had their residence before the war or during the war within the British Empire and who suffered damage in their persons or property through measures of a Government of the Empire or through any occurence such as tumult, pillage, etc. Indemnification on the same basis by Germany of British subjects.

"4. Armistice and peace to be concluded with Italy at the same time.

"The above points have been repeatedly indicated to me on general lines by the Fuehrer in conversations as the basis for an understanding with England. Beyond these no points were specified.

"With regard to Iraq, which came into the picture shortly before my flight to Scotland, the Fuehrer only remarked that this country should not be left in the lurch. More definite observationswere not made to me in this respect by him."

J: May I add one thing to this, I believe the first point should read -

Dr.G:I don't quite know what 'left in the lurch' means, but it is rather interesting to know, it's a remark made by the Fuehrer apparently; do I get the idea right, that since Germany had urged Rashild Ali to revolt and had promised him German help, that Germany under these terms should not leave Iraq without German support? May I just repeat, I didn't quite understand the sentence about the Fuehrer and Iraq; you say there, before you left Germany, the Fuehrer - I don't know your expression in German - said that Iraq must not be left in the lurch, and I was asking what that meant, did it mean , I am asking, did it mean that since Germany had promised her help to Rashid Ali and had encouraged him to revolt against British influence, that in the peace settlement Germany must see that Iraq had German support?

H0671-0074

J: To this point I can really make no closer statement, as said, it was shortly before my departure, the Fuehrer only told me, one cannot leave Iraq in a lurch, what is to be understood by that, I cannot say; thus, to this point I must exclude more specific explanations. It would have to be clarified by other means.

Dr.G: I wanted to know what is that supposed to mean ?

Int: He can't explain that, he says.

J: Can't explain. "To leave in a lurch" means in German, one cannot just pass over it - without consideration for Iraq. The Fuehrer's idea is to point 1.) mainly that it would be the condition in order to prevent a new war between Germany and England for all times.

Dr.G: I think I had better ask you, please Herr Hess, if you will explain these conditions a little more. You have had constant conversations with Herr Hitler about them, and I am sure the conversations couldn't be written down on two half sheets of paper; it must have been much longer than that.

J: I would like to ask you then to give me more detailed question in order to get more specific.

Dr.G: There are one or two other details which I want to know. I don't know quite what is meant by Germany having Europe as a sphere of interest, and I am sure you must have discussed it with the Fuehrer, as you know so well his mind. What, for example, would happen to Holland ?

J: These are questions about which the Fuehrer did not speak I must tell you. The Fuehrer said only one time in reference to the occupied territories : "There are people who

H0671-0075

believe that I would keep all that which we occupied - I am not going to be crazy.

Dr. G: You will forgive me for asking because, after all, that's why we have met, isn't it? The first thing the Government will ask would be that. If the Fuehrer feels that he mustn't leave Iraq in the lurch, it may be that England feels that it mustn't leave Holland in the lurch. I am quite sure, that you, when you conversed with the Fuehrer whmn you know so well, in such intimacy, I am sure that the discussion must have included some discussion as to what was to happen to Holland and it would be no use my reporting to the British Government, if there was to be a sphere of interest in Europe. if I couldn't answer that question.

J: I tried once to draw out the Fuehrer in the respect.

J: "And then he said to me" as yet I have not racked my brains over this question, that will all have to come later."

Dr. G: I think, I must ask a similar question about some other great countries. Norway, you see, according to your view, Norway which used to be quite an independant state has got into trouble because of the nation of Britain Well, I do not agree, but that is the German view. Well then, as Norway has never done anything wrong to Germany, what is to happen to Norway when the war is over? Is she to be made subject to Germany.

J: I am convinced, no. But I cannot say it. The Fuehrer has made no specific statement to me on this subject. He said: "I am not interested at all in it, I have now got something else do think about".

Dr. G: No doubt, but you will forgive me, I am sure, for seeming rather pressing. It isn't that I want to make you uncomfortable at all, but, after all, this is what I have come here for and it is not much use making reports to the British Government if I don't understand what the reports mean, you see, Let us take Greece. Did Greece do any wrong in defending her own territory? Surely not.

Dr.G: I mean, Germany has got no quarrel with Greece.

J: But an alliance with Italy.

Dr.G: But before Greece was invaded, Greece was informed publicly that Germany had no quarrel with Greece.

J: Yes, but Greece, that we thought to keep Greece, that was a senseless question from the beginning.

Dr.G: If Germany is to have the sphere of interest over the Continent, she is to have the sphere of interest over Greece.

J: This "sphere of interest" concerns primarily England, namely that England may not be in the position, in the future, or rather may no longer be justified to form coalitions against Germany on the continent.

H0671-0076

H0671-0077

Dr. G: I can make out what he means. He says: "When I say sphere of interest, what I wish to imply is, in the future England is not to concern herself with what goes on in Europe if it comes contrary to the German policy." Isn't that so?

Int; Yes, "From coalitions against her on the Continent," he said.

J: As little as we will mix in the affairs of the British Empire in any way, as little may England mix in the affairs of Europe the future.

Dr. G: But there seems to be a different. The domestic affairs of the British Empire are British. Are all the domestic affairs of the Continent of Europe German?

J: No, we do not even insist on that and we do no even have the intention, to care about details in these countries as it is done by England in the Empire.

Dr. G: I made the observation that it might be that the affairs of the British Empire domestic affairs, but I wanted to ask whether all the domestic affairs of the Continent of Europe are German.

J: No, not at all.

Dr. G: You see, I can't help feeling a little that this phrase about the sphere of interests on the Continent is rather a little vague.

J: But I do not believe as vague as it may appear perhaps; for it depends for us that we as the dominating state of Europe must not expect continually that England on her part does mix in the affairs of a state in Europe. That is the main thing that is said from the beginning, this is Germany's area of interest.

H0671-0078

Dr.G: I see. Do you know, Herr Hess, whether the Fuehrer has communicated to Italy these ideas and Italy has consented to be under the suzerainty of Germany ?

J: No, I've changed this here, that is incorrectly expressed, I had to change it.

Dr.M: He's changed it. In the first question he has changed "Germany" to 'the Axis'.

Dr.G: Oh/ /I see, Would you mind reading it?

Dr.M: "In order to prevent future wars between the Axis and England there should be a definition of interest spheres. The interest sphere of the Axis in Europe, and England's sphere of interest is the Empire."

Dr.G: I beg your pardon. I saw you alter it but I didn't realize what it was. Then perhaps it is that Italy is to have her sphere of influence in the Balkans, Italy perhaps is to have her sphere of interest in Greece ?

J: That is an affair which must be clarified between Germany and Italy. But at any rate, England cannot meddle with the Balkans may I point out that there were once times in English history, where that was really self-evident. That war the period of Gladstone and Lord Salisburg, who had kept themselves entirely aloof - and these were really very prosperous times. Would you please translate that.?

Int: In which respect?

J: That in the European affairs they did not --

Dr.G: You are making reference to the policy of Mr. Gladstone?

J: Yes.

H0671-0079

Dr.G: I would recommend to you a history of the year 1878 and there you will find all about the Bulgarian question/

J: Yes, there may have been individual questions, but certainly not in this manner which arose between Germany and England. They only came up because England concerned herself with the European situation in a manner which simply leads to war. It cannot be denied. The world war, respectively the war between England and Germany, came about because of the fact that England had and still has agreements on the continent. I don't know if Dr.GUTERIE has understood this.

Dr.G: Yes, I know what you want to say about Lord SALISBURY. Well, I will, of course, most faithfully report what you have said, Herr HESS, and I am very glad to have been avaiable to receive from you the account which you have given, because you wished to speak to somebody who represented the British Government and it happened to have been me and I am very glad, because we have met before. I will certainly report all this.

J: May I also state that I now have the personal conviction and that I also have the conviction of the Fuehrer that if England were not to agree to these fundamental agreements, sooner or later the day will come when she will be forced to accede to them. Will you please translate this?

Int: The day will come when England will be forced to accede to these conditions.

Dr.G: Yes. But I don't think, if I may so, that that particular argument will be very good for the British Cabinet because, you know, there is a good deal of courage in this country and we are not very fond ofthreats.

H0671-0080

Int: There is rather much courage in this country.

J: Yes. Yes.

Dr.M: Dr.GUTHRIE means that this opinion is actually not liked by the cabinet.

J: Yes. Then history must decide. The difference will only be the one, that...

Dr.G: It may be a difference between the German mentality and the British mentality.

Dr.M: An appeal to reason will always be accepted here, but a threat always has a different effect, is that not right?

J: Yes, may I mention that this was not to be taken as a threat, but as my personal opinion and I wanted to add that then, when at a later time tremendous sacrifices will have to be made in material, and mainly also in valuable irreplacable human beings, England will have sacrifices in tonnage which are very valuable for this country especially, will have made in industrial installation which have been destroyed, in buildings, which have been ruined in cities without that there is, according to my opinion the least necessity.

Dr.G: I am afraid I must note that.

Dr.M: He said it should not be taken as a threat. It was not instended as a threat, it was intended as an expression of his own opinion. We should have to come to these terms only with the difference that it would be done after the expenditure of an enormous amount of treasure, the loss on both sides of irreplaceable lives, materials, tonnage, which was particularly valuable to us, and industrial pland and buildings of all kinds.

J: And not forgetting prestige.

Dr.M: Not to mention prestige.

H0671-0081

Dr.G: Yes, I see. Well, in any case, I will report faithfully what Herr Hess has said to me and that, I think, is really what we met for.

J: May I say again that on my part I am very grateful to Dr. Guthrie for coming here.

Dr.G: I was very willing to come. We both of us want to do, I feel sure, what is the best thing for our two countries, and for my part I am very, very sorry that this immense, grave event should have brought efforts for peace to nothing. You must not ask me to agree whose fault that was, but I am very sorry that efforts for peace failed.

J: May I ask to translate that for me?

Int: Dr. Guthrie is very sorry that these ...

Dr.G: I am very sorry that affairs are complicated, but you must not ask me to agree as to where the blame lies.

J: I did not quite understand that.

Dr.M: He cannot share your opinion in reference to the responsibility for the war. That is an affair about which one must have different opinions, but he is sorry that the war nevertheless broke out between the two countries, and that the efforts at the time for keeping the peace, were fruitless.

Dr.G: May I ask one or two things? "Return of German Colonies." Well now, am I to understand that includes German South-West Africa?

J: Yes, all German colonies.

Dr.G: Because sometimes the statement has been made that the German claim did not include South-West Africa. I am authorised then, by you at least, to say to General Smuts that is does include German South-West Africa?

H0671-0082

J: Yes.

Dr. G: Very well then.

Dr. M: The Japanese islands also?

J: Not the Japanese islands.

Dr. M: All the colonies except the Japanese Islands.

J: But now I have to tell something in addition which is for the cabinet, but which I can only tell Dr.Guthrie alone, may I do that ?

Dr.M : He likes to add something alone to you.

Dr.G : But that will have to be done very slowly.

END

Amended version:

dated 17th November , 1941.

H-13/ Sworn Statement ~~Exhibit 8~~ Filed March 22, 1946

Having been instructed on the consequences of a false sworn statement, I declare the following under oath, to be submitted to the International Military Tribunal in NUERNBERG.

1. Personal Data:

FATH, Hildegard, born 19 Feb 1909 in PFORZHEIM, at present in prison in NUERNBERG.

2. Facts:

I was employed as secretary of the Fuehrer's deputy Rudolf HESS in MUNICH from 17 Oct 1933 until his flight to England on May 1941.

Beginning in summer 1940 -I cannot remember the exact time - by order of HESS I had to procure secret weather reports about climatic conditions over the Britsh Isles and over the North Sea, and to forward them to HESS. I received the reports from a Captain BUSCH. I also received reports partly from Miss SPE[illegible], the secretary of HESS with his liaison staff in BERLIN.

HESS left a letter behind him on his departure by air for England, which was handed to the Fuehrer at a time when HESS had already landed in England. I read a copy of the letter. The letter began somewhat with the words: "My Fuehrer, when you receive this letter, I shall be in England." I do not remember the exact wording of the letter. Mainly, HESS occupied himself in the letter with the proposals which he wanted to present in England in order to achieve peace. I do not remember the details of the proposed settlement. I

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H0671-0083

H0671-0084

can however assure with all certainty that no word was mentioned about the Soviet Union or about the fact that a peace treaty was to be concluded with England in order to have the back free for another front. If this would have been mentioned in the letter, it would have been impressed on my memory. I had to gain the absolute impression from the contents of the letter that HESS undertook this extraordinary flight in order to prevent further bloodshed and in order to create favorable prerequisites for the conclusion of a peace.

I got to know Rudolf HESS and his attitude to certain questions fairly exactly in my capacity as his secretary for many years. If it is now told to me that in a letter of the Reich Minister of Justice to the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery of 17 April 1941, it is mentioned that the Fuehrer's deputy has presented the introduction of corporal punishment against Poles in the annexed Polish territories for consideration, then I cannot believe that this attitude of the office, which HESS headed, was caused by the latter's personal decision. Such a proposal would fully contradict the position and attitude which the Fuehrer's deputy has shown on other occasions in such questions.

s/ HILDEGARD FATH.

SWORN STATEMENT

Having been instructed on the consequences of a false sworn statement I declare the following under oath to be submitted to the International Military Tribunal at Nuernberg:

I. Personal Data:

SPEER, Ingeborg, born on 23 May 1912 in Bremen, Secretary

II. Facts:

I was secretary to the Fuehrer's Deputy Rudolf HESS from 1 May 1934 until 10 May 1941, the time of his flight to England, with the latter's liaison staff in Berlin, 64 Wilhelmstrasse. It was the duty of the staff to establish liaison between the Reich ministries and the other top Reich authorities on one hand and the Office of the Fuehrer's Deputy on the other. On the basis of my activity I can testify as to the following:

1.) Beginning in the late summer of 1940 - I cannot give the exact period of time anymore - I was ordered by the Fuehrer's Deputy to obtain weather reports over the Channel, the North Sea and the British Isles from a weather observation station of the armed forces on the channel coast, and to submit them to him. I had received the strictest order from Rudolf HESS to discuss the subject with no one and to maintain complete silence.

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H0671-0086

2.) Under the authority of the Fuehrer's Deputy Rudolf HESS also were the party courts of the NSDAP. I can remember that proceedings had been instituted in connection with the incidents from 8 to 9 November 1938 against a number of political leaders before the Supreme Party Court, because of excesses in connection with these incidents. I have personally participated in one of these trials and can remember that the President of the Party Court has condemned the actions of the accused party members with the sharpest words - according to my memory they had been guilty of inflicting physical harm - . I presume that these political leaders were expelled from the party. However I do not know this for certain, because I was not present when the sentences were pronounced.

Nuernberg, 5 March 1946 signed Ingeborg SPITTA